Friday 17 March 2017

Who will win in priority dispute between a mortgagee and a tenant (Part 4)?


Readers will be familiar with a series of 3 posts I wrote about priority disputes between a registered mortgagee and a tenant.

To refresh your memory, the posts can be read here: http://bit.ly/2ntwt5T, http://bit.ly/2n4DMQP, and http://bit.ly/2n4DHwv

Despite the lack of success in these cases by tenants, that has not stopped tenants from trying to restrain a mortgagee from exercising its rights to possession of the mortgaged property after the borrower/landlord’s default.

In Annesley v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] VSC 323, Derham As J, dealt with such a case.

In that case, Westpac, as mortgagee in possession, sought to dismiss the tenant’s claim summarily pursuant to ss 62 and 63 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010.  Alternatively, it sought judgment, a permanent stay or that the claim be struck out pursuant to the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015.

The registered proprietor and the previous registered proprietor of the property at 349 Nepean Highway, Brighton East, Victoria (‘the Property’) had borrowed moneys from Westpac secured by a mortgage over the Property.

The borrowers defaulted under the mortgage and on 2 April 2014 the Victorian Supreme Court ordered that Westpac recover possession of the Property. Appeals from that order were unsuccessful.

The Sheriff executed a warrant for possession on 10 February 2016 and obtained possession of the Property for Westpac. The Sheriff’s reports reveal the Property was then, and for a considerable period before that date had been, uninhabited and uninhabitable.

The next day, the plaintiff, (‘Mr Annesley’), commenced a VCAT proceeding, seeking an order under s 472 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 ('RTA') restraining Westpac from evicting him from the Property without obtaining a possession order from VCAT. Attached to the application was what purported to be a residential tenancy agreement for the Property dated 8 August 2015 between Mr Annesley and the previous registered proprietor of the property. The residential tenancy agreement relied upon by Mr Annesley contained a code ‘RT1(11/15)’ which an officer of Consumer Affairs Victoria swore means the document was last updated in November 2015. In other words, the pro forma residential tenancy agreement used was not available until November 2015. 

On 11 February 2016, VCAT’s Residential Tenancies List heard Mr Annesley’s application in the absence of the landlord and Westpac.

The Tribunal made interim orders on the basis that it found that the landlord and tenant were parties to a tenancy agreement subject to the RTA. The landlord and the Westpac Banking Corporation were required to take certain action in performance of duties under the tenancy agreement or the RTA.

At a further hearing on 29 March 2016, the Tribunal dismissed Mr Annesley’s application and set aside the orders made on 11 February 2016.
    
On 11 May 2016, Robson J granted Westpac a further warrant of possession in respect of the Property as a result of the previous registered proprietor of the Property re-entering the Property without permission. In addition, Robson J granted injunctions restraining Mr Annesley, the registered proprietor of the Property and the previous registered proprietor of the Property from seeking to re-enter the Property once Westpac was restored to possession of it

Federal Court Proceedings
As an aside, on 25 March 2015, registered proprietor and the previous registered proprietor of the property had commenced proceedings against Westpac in the Federal Court of Australia. The proceeding concerned the same matters that had arisen in the Supreme Court proceeding in which Westpac had obtained an order for possession of the Property in 2014. The registered proprietor and the previous registered proprietor of the property sought, amongst other things, orders restraining Westpac from enforcing its mortgage over the Property and seeking payment of damages. On 24 April 2015, Westpac made application for summary dismissal of the proceeding and on 27 October 2015, Beach J summarily dismissed the proceeding. The reasons for judgment published by Beach J on 27 October 2015 reveal a long and arduous process between the time of the making of the application by Westpac and the time of judgment. That long and arduous process was a product of a variety of applications made by registered proprietor and the previous registered proprietor of the property, and a series of adjournments and extensions of time as well as applications for leave to appeal from orders made by his Honour of an interlocutory kind. The account given by Beach J of these events shows a determination by registered proprietor and the previous registered proprietor of the property to delay and obfuscate.

The Course of the current Proceeding
The writ was issued on 1 April 2016 but not served. Nevertheless, Westpac entered an appearance to the writ on 5 April 2016.

Westpac filed its summons seeking summary judgment on 12 April 2016. The summons was returnable on 2 May 2016. On 28 April 2016, Westpac’s solicitors emailed the Associate Justice’s chambers, and copied the email to Mr Annesley, the registered proprietor and the previous registered proprietor of the property, attaching electronic copies of the affidavits and their exhibits for the convenience of the Court.

The registered proprietor and the previous registered proprietor of the property did not participate in the hearing or appear in court on that date.

An email response was received from Mr Annesley on 29 April 2016. He said in his email, among other things:

… I have not served notice of this action on any of the defendants as detailed in my writ and statement of claim.
I do not wish to be dragged into these proceedings at the present time.

The Associate Justice’s chambers responded to all the parties confirming that the proceeding had been listed before him on 2 May 2016 at 2.15 pm.

On the particular facts of the case, the Associate Justice found that Mr Annesley had no real prospect of establishing that he was a tenant at the Property pursuant to the alleged residential tenancy agreement.

His Honour went on to find that the indicia also provided substantial grounds to infer, as a matter of fact, that the tenancy agreement was not a genuine transaction entered into between Mr Annesley and the previous registered proprietor of the property. It appeared to be a device established to frustrate the rights of Westpac under its mortgage and its judgment for possession.

In this case, Westpac did not submit that its registered mortgage over the Property and its judgment against the registered proprietor for possession, each of which pre-date any purported tenancy agreement to which Mr Annesley is a party, has the result that Westpac’s proprietary interest as mortgagee is not subject to the interest of a tenant in possession under s 42(2)(e) of the TLA.

It did not so submit because of the operation of the terms of s 216 of the RTA, which provides:

Despite any Act or law to the contrary, a tenancy agreement does not terminate and must not be terminated except in accordance with this Division or Part 7 or 8.

His Honour concluded that this provision, and all the provisions to which it points, are premised on the assumption that there is a valid and enforceable tenancy agreement.  

At paragraphs 88 to 89, Derham As J held:
As a general proposition, it is an essential element of a present demise or grant of a lease (a letting) by contract that the tenant is given exclusive possession, and quite enjoyment, of the premises in question. That is, if another person is lawfully in possession, or has the present right to possession, of the premises there can be no valid demise or grant of exclusive possession to another.

[89] In my view, if the tenancy agreement was entered into as alleged by Mr Annesley, there is no real prospect of him establishing that the tenancy agreement ever had any force or effect as a demise or grant of exclusive possession of the Property for the term of 12 months. That is because when the previous registered proprietor of the property purported to enter into the tenancy agreement he had no right to possession to grant to Mr Annesley. He held, at best, an equitable interest in the fee simple which was subject to Westpac’s legal mortgage and to its right to possession pursuant to the judgment of the Court.

Conclusion
After a very lengthy delay, due to the number of obstacles placed in the way of the mortgagee by the players, and apart from having some interest as a result of finding apparent misconduct by the former registered proprietor and the alleged tenant, the claim ultimately otherwise went the same way as those referred to in my previous posts: the mortgagee prevailed over the interest of the alleged tenant.

WG Stark
Hayden Starke Chambers

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