Tuesday, 19 December 2017

Can I lodge a second caveat if my first caveat is removed or lapses in Victoria?

I have recently come across a spate of cases where a caveat has been removed (either by the Registrar of Titles on application, or by Court order), only for the caveator to lodge the same caveat again!

Section 91(4) of the Transfer of Land Act, 1958 makes it clear that the second caveat cannot remain on the title. That sub-section provides:

A caveat that has lapsed or been removed by an order of a court shall not be renewed by or on behalf of the same person in respect of the same interest.

Case law – Section 91(4)
Gobbo J was called on to remove a caveat under section 91(4) in Gurwitz v Gurwitz [1988] VicSC 239.

At the end of the first paragraph on page 4 of the unreported judgment, Gobbo J noted:
… nothing was done and, accordingly, simply as a matter of the operation of s. 89(a) (sic), the first caveat lapsed. On 4 May the respondent lodged another caveat, which I will refer to as the second caveat, through different solicitors.

At the start of the first paragraph on page 5 of the unreported judgment, Gobbo J noted:
The applicant accordingly applied to remove the second caveat on the three bases ... Secondly, that the second caveat should be removed because it covers the same ground as the first caveat and falls within section 91 (4) …
At the foot of page 5 of the unreported judgment, Gobbo J noted:
… The section is not concerned with matters of grounds or evidence in support of the interest. The sub-section could scarcely have been intended to depend (page 6) upon whether the evidence in support of a particular interest varied and, for that reason also, perhaps the grounds in support of a particular interest. It seems to me that what the section is designed to do was to identify whether it was, in substance, the same interest that was set up.  
At the foot of page 8 of the unreported judgment, Gobbo J concluded:
I am therefore of the view that section 91 (4) applies in the present case. It is clear that this first caveat had lapsed. It further appears that the second caveat is one that is made on behalf of the same person in respect of the same interest in the same parcel of land, and that the prohibition against it being renewed applies here, and that provides good cause as to why the second caveat should be removed.
In Sinn v National Westminster Finance Ltd [1985] VR 363, Tadgell J considered the operation of section 91(4), in the following terms (at VR 365 – 6):
A provision equivalent to section 91 (4) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 has stood in the Torrens title legislation of this State since the Transfer of Land Statute 1866 (Act No. 301) but it appears to have attracted remarkably little attention from the courts.Venerable of lineage and economical of words though section 91 (4) is, it is not a model of clarity. The following observations seem to be deserved. A caveat, once it has lapsed or have been removed, cannot in strictness be renewed in the sense of restored, revived, regenerated or re-established. The word “renewed” in the sub-section seems to mean “replaced” or, perhaps, “repeated”. The phrase “by your on behalf of the same person in respect of the same interest” evidently involves a kind of ellipsis. I think it must intended to convey, when read the words preceding it, that a person by whom or on whose behalf a caveat has been lodged that has lapsed or been removed shall not lodge or have lodged on his behalf another caveat in respect of the same interest as that in respect of which the first caveat was lodged. … the effect of s91(4), therefore, would appear to be that a person may not claim and specify by a caveat an interest which is the same interest as that which he has claimed and specified by a caveat that has lapsed or been removed.
In Burgtreus Pty Ltd v Burgin & Anor [2005] VSC 339, Cummins J dealt with another similar application. At paragraph 16, Cummins J noted:
The essential points are these in my view. First, in my view the caveat, being the second caveat, covers the same ground as the first caveat and falls within section 91 (4) of the Act. The first defendant lodged the first caveat … The stated interest there claimed was an estate in fee simple; the grounds of the claim an equitable interest by way of constructive trust. The second caveat, the subject of these proceedings, again claims an estate in fee simple; however the grounds of claim are “Financial contributions to purchase price of each property and labour and cost of improvements. Verbal agreements”. It is clear that a caveat ought not be accepted in the circumstance where the same interest is claimed in the second as the first. That was established in Gurwitz v Gurwitz; also Sinn v National Westminster Finance Ltd.
In Austwide Property & Developments Pty Ltd v Vukasinec [2004] VSC 333; BC200406309 Osborn J dealt with an application under section 91(4) as follows (at paragraphs 9 to 10):
[9] In the current case it is contended the caveat is bad for two reasons: firstly, it is said the caveat does not disclose a caveatable interest in land. Secondly, it is said that it has been lodged in breach of s 90(4) (sic) of the Transfer of Land Act. This provides: "A caveat shall not be renewed by or on behalf of the same person in respect of the same interest."
[10] Although it is strongly arguable that the caveat does not disclose a caveatable interest, I would have some reluctance to dispose of it on this basis if I were persuaded that what was really in issue was a matter of English expression by a litigant in person whose first language I infer is not English. It is strictly unnecessary, however, for me to determine this question because I have reached the view that there is no credible evidence that the grounds of the interest claimed could be sustained and that the caveat was lodged in breach of s 90(4) (sic) of the Transfer of Land Act.

In the matter of Jankovic v Dobrijevic (SCI 2017 03587), I appeared for the plaintiff who sought removal of a caveat lodged in breach of section 91(4). The Honourable Justice Jack Forrest of the Supreme Court of Victoria ordered the removal of the caveat and ordered the caveator to pay the plaintiff’s costs on an indemnity basis.

In the matter of Strathmore Views P/L and anor v High Street Projects P/L and anor (SCI 2017 04894), the Honourable Justice Keogh ordered the removal of the caveat and ordered the caveator to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceeding.

In both of these cases, the second caveat (claiming the same interest as the caveat that had already been removed), should never have been lodged.

Although it seems clear to me that neither of the caveats in question should have been lodged, and when requested to be removed, the caveats should have been removed without the need for proceedings, this didn't occur. 

As readers will know, if a Victorian practising lawyer lodged a second caveat in these circumstances, that would amount to professional misconduct, rendering the lawyer liable to be dealt with by the Victorian Legal Services Board + Commissioner.

As noted, the Court in Jankovic made an order for indemnity costs, on the basis that the registered proprietor of the property ought not be out of pocket as a result of the conduct of the caveator in lodging a caveat in circumstances where it should never have been lodged, and then refusing to remove that caveat.
  

W G Stark
Hayden Starke Chambers

Thursday, 21 September 2017

Are there any substantial amendments planned for the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic)?

The Transfer of Land Act, 1958 was amended substantially this week. The amending Act was proclaimed on 19 September 2017, and came into effect on 20th  September 2017. The Subdivision Act 1988 and the Valuation of Land Act, 1960 were also amended. 

Here is a link to the legislation: 

http://bit.ly/2hkYGpZ 

WG Stark 
Hayden Starke Chambers












Tuesday, 15 August 2017

Is a real estate agent an 'agent' for the purposes of a notice under the Sale of Land Act, 1962 (Part 2)?

In my last post (see here: http://bit.ly/2uUgUU9), I discussed the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Tan v Russell [2016] VSC 93. 

That decision was controversial among property lawyers, and led to amendments being made to the Sale of Land Act, 1962 (the SLA). 

The Court of Appeal recently handed down its decision in the appeal from that decision. 

In Lo v Russell [2016] VSCA 323, the Court of Appeal (Warren CJ, Tate and McLeish JJA) unanimously overturned the decision of Cameron J in Tan v Russell.  


Background
Subject to various modifications, the Contract of Sale of Real Estate in this case conformed to the standard form of contract in the Estate Agents (Contracts) Regulations 2008. 

The cover page of the Contract of Sale contained, within a box headed ‘IMPORTANT NOTICE TO PURCHASERS’, a notice as to the cooling-off period, as required by s 31(6) of the SLA. That notice relevantly read as follows: 
Cooling-off period (Section 31 Sale of Land Act 1962)You may end this contract within 3 clear business days of the day that your [sic] sign the contract if none of the exceptions listed below applies to you.
You must either give the vendor or the vendor’s agent written notice that you are ending the contract or leave the notice at the address of the vendor or the vendor’s agent to end this contract within this time in accordance with this cooling-off provision.
You are entitled to a refund of all the money you paid EXCEPT for $100 or 0.2% of the purchase price (whichever is more) if you end the contract in this way.
On the following page, under the heading ‘PARTICULARS OF SALE’, were listed the ‘vendor’s estate agent’ (giving contact details of Marshall White including the email address of Mr Gibbons), followed by the name (but not any contact details) of the ‘vendor’, the name and contact details of the ‘vendor’s legal practitioner or conveyancer’, the ‘purchaser’ and the ‘purchaser’s legal practitioner or conveyancer’, and particulars of the ‘land’, ‘property address’, ‘goods sold with land’ and ‘payment’.

Special conditions 3.1 and 3.2 of the Contract of Sale provided for the replacement of general conditions as to service, so as to read as follows:
17.1 Any document sent by—(a) post is taken to have been served on the next business day after posting, unless proved otherwise;(b) email is taken to have been served at the time of receipt as provided in section 13A of the Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000.
17.2 Any demand, notice or document required to be served by or on any party may be served by or on the legal practitioner or a conveyancer for that party. It is sufficiently served if served on the party or on the legal practitioner or conveyancer:(a) personally; or(b) by pre-paid post; or(c) in any manner authorised by law or the Supreme Court for service of documents, including any manner authorised for service on or by a legal practitioner; or(d) by email.

General condition 11.1, concerning payment of the deposit, provided:
The purchaser must pay the deposit:(a) to the vendor’s licensed estate agent; or(b) if there is no estate agent, to the vendor’s legal practitioner or conveyancer; or(c) if the vendor directs, into a special purpose account in an authorised deposit-taking institution in Victoria specified by the vendor in the joint names of the purchaser and the vendor.

Within the time required under the Contract of Sale and the SLA, Mr Tan emailed the real estate agent notifying the purchasers' intention to exercise their right to cool off from the Contract of Sale. 

Shortly after the Notice was given, the purchasers' lawyer demanded that the vendor refund the deposit (less 0.2 per cent of the purchase price) by 4:00 pm on the day of the demand. The vendor did not do so.

The purchasers filed a statement of claim in the Supreme Court seeking a declaration that the Contract of Sale was terminated, payment by the vendor of the balance of the deposit (plus interest), damages and costs.

Later, the vendor's lawyers served a Notice of Default on the purchasers for failing to pay the balance of the deposit by the end of June as provided for in the contract. The notice required that the default be remedied within 14 days of service of the notice. The purchasers did not pay the balance.

The vendor contended that the Contract was rescinded and made arrangements to re-sell the property.

Later again, the vendor filed a defence and counterclaim alleging that the purchasers had not lawfully exercised their cooling-off right. He sought damages, interest and costs. 

The property was re-sold at auction for $4.07 million. 

At trial, the vendor sought damages under his counterclaim consisting of the residue of the deposit, the loss on resale (being $410,000) and the costs incurred in respect of resale including by reason of the ensuing delay in settlement.

The Appeal
The only live question before the Court of Appeal was whether the trial judge was correct to conclude that the email terminating the contract was not effective under s 31 of the SLA.

Section 15 makes provision for the service of notices under the SLA. It relevantly provides:
(1) A notice in writing required or authorized to be given by this Act shall be sufficiently served upon any person—(a) if it is served personally or left at his last known place of abode in Victoria; or(b) if served personally or by post upon his legal practitioner or conveyancer named in the contract or otherwise authorized by the person to be served to act in the particular matter.

The purchasers submitted that ‘agent’ in s 31(3) was capable of comprehending an estate agent and that, in cases such as the present where the prescribed form of contract of sale was relevantly adopted, it included the person nominated as the ‘vendor’s estate agent’ in the particulars of sale.

The Court of Appeal concluded (at paragraph 45) that s 31(3) does not operate to designate a vendor’s estate agent as a person capable of receiving a cooling-off notice under s 31. In other words, ‘agent’ in s 31(3) has its ordinary legal meaning.

At paragraph 51, the Court of Appeal then considered: 
The issue is then whether the contract itself constituted Marshall White the agent of the [vendor] for the purpose of s 31. The starting point must be the ‘important notice’ which embodies the language of s 31(3) itself. It uses, of course, the words ‘the vendor or the vendor’s agent’ to describe the person to whom the notice must be given. At the top of the next page are found the details of the ‘vendor’s estate agent’. No other person is described in the contract using the term ‘agent’. Further, the cover page includes the words ‘Any person whose signature is secured by an estate agent acknowledges being given by the agent …’, indicating a use of the word ‘agent’ to describe an estate agent. As the applicants submitted, ‘agent’ is commonly used as shorthand for an estate agent. Whereas, for the reasons given, Parliament did not adopt that shorthand usage in s 31(3), the same conclusion does not necessarily follow when the same words are replicated in a contract of sale.
The Court of Appeal noted that the sale contract is to be construed in accordance with the general principles of construction of contracts. That requires consideration of the language used by the parties, the surrounding circumstances known to them and the commercial purpose or objects to be secured by the contract.

The Court noted at paragraph 53 that: 
... there is no reason why the contract may not go further than the minimum requirements of the legislation. In particular, s 31 does not insist that the vendor nominate an agent or provide particulars for service on that agent, but a contract to which the section applies may well do so. Moreover, while s 31 does not have the effect that the vendor’s estate agent is an ‘agent’ for the purposes of the section, the contract may have that result.
The Court stated that it is commonplace, where the vendor has an estate agent, that the purchaser is likely, up until and including the point of signing the contract, to have dealt principally if not exclusively with that estate agent rather than with the vendor or the vendor’s legal practitioner or conveyancer. Ordinarily, where an estate agent has been appointed, those other parties have no involvement with prospective purchasers prior to sale. It is in the nature of an estate agent’s role that he or she deals with prospective purchasers, and a legal practitioner or conveyancer is generally not required until after the contract is signed. Moreover, the estate agent accepts the purchaser’s deposit in accordance with both statute and the present contract. The estate agent with whom a purchaser will have been so dealing is prominently identified as such in the contract. This is an important aspect of the context in which the contract of sale operates.

At paragraph 55, the Court concluded that:
... it is natural that a reasonable person in the position of the purchaser ... reading the contract would infer that the ‘vendor’s agent’ to whom reference is made in the ‘important notice’ is the person with whom the purchaser has been dealing in place of the vendor and who is described immediately thereafter as the ‘vendor’s estate agent’. That conclusion is supported by the use of the word ‘agent’ earlier on the cover page in a context where it plainly means ‘estate agent’.
The purpose of the notice provision is better achieved by a construction which enables the purchaser to rely on the common use of the word ‘agent’ to describe an ‘estate agent’, rather than requiring the purchaser to divine from provisions which do not even use that word that the true ‘agent’ is, in fact, somebody else. 

In the opinion of the Court of Appeal, the conduct of the vendor in signing the contract did convey that the requisite authority was given to the real estate agent. The court concluded that it was sufficient for the purchasers to demonstrate that the vendor’s signature of the contract authorised his estate agent to receive a notice under s 31(3).

The application for leave to appeal was granted and the appeal allowed. The orders of the trial judge were set aside. In their place it should be declared that the contract of sale was terminated by the purchasers on 9 April 2014. It was ordered that the vendor pay the purchasers the balance of the deposit in the sum of $341,040 together with interest and that the vendor’s counterclaim be dismissed.

Conclusion 
The Court of Appeal did not agree with the purchasers' argument that section 31 of the SLA authorised them to serve a Cooling Off Notice on the vendor's real estate agent. However, the particular terms of the Contract of Sale did grant that authorisation. 

Legislation amended
As a direct result of the decision in Tan v Russell, the Victorian Parliament passed legislation, with effect from 11 May 2017, confirming that real estate agents are, and always were, a vendor's agent for the purpose of section 31 of the SLA (see the amended section 31(3) and the new section 31A of the SLA)

After a period of some angst for property lawyers, it is now clear that a purchaser can serve a Cooling Off Notice under section 31 of the SLA on a vendor's real estate agent. 

WG Stark
Hayden Starke Chambers

Monday, 14 August 2017

Is a real estate agent an 'agent' for the purposes of a notice under the Sale of Land Act, 1962?

In Eng Kiat Tan and Cheng Lo v Thomas John Russell [2016] VSC 93, Cameron J of the Supreme Court of Victoria had to determine whether a purchaser had validly terminated a Contract of Sale of Real Estate pursuant to the cooling off rights granted under section 31 of the Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic). 
The deceptively simple issue that the Supreme Court of Victoria had to decide was whether the vendor’s real estate agent was an “agent” for the purpose of being given a cooling off notice.
Background 
The purchasers entered into a contract in April 2014 to purchase a property at 43 Erin Street, Richmond (‘the Property’) for $4.48million. They paid a deposit of $350,000, with the remaining $98,000 due in June 2014. 
Within three clear business days after signing the contract, the purchasers gave notice to the real estate agent that they did not wish to proceed. 
The vendor refused to accept that the contract had been terminated validly. He asserted that the purchasers had repudiated, and he resold the property at a loss for $4.07million. 
The purchasers commenced a proceeding seeking recovery of the deposit; the vendor counterclaimed seeking the balance of the deposit and the loss suffered on the resale of the property. 
Arguments
The purchaser argued that the expression “agent” in section 31 must extend to the vendor’s real estate because, among other things, the purchaser had only three days to make inquiries as whether a person was or was not an “agent” with authority to accept the termination notice. 
The purchaser also referred to Lloyd and Rimmer’s Sale of Land Act Victoria where the authors say that for the purpose of section 31 “agent” includes but is not limited to the estate agent engaged by the vendor in connection with the sale.
The vendor argued that section 31 did not create a statutory authority to receive a termination notice: the purchaser had to establish that the vendor’s real estate had actual or ostensible authority to accept the termination notice and there were no facts which established any authority in the vendor’s real estate agent beyond that usually granted to real estate agent.
Conclusion
The Honourable Justice Cameron held that section 31 did not create a statutory authority in a real estate agent to accept a termination notice.
As a result, she found in effect that the Contract had not been validly terminated, and the purchasers' failure to pay the balance of the deposit when due amounted to repudiation. 
Cameron J gave judgment on the counterclaim to the vendor. 
Implications 
This decision had far reaching implications: it seemed as though it would not just relate to Cooling Off Notices under section 31. A real estate agent could be the vendor's agent for other purposes associated with the sale; as a result, property lawyers, conveyancers and real estate agents were left in a state of uncertainty. 
Recommendation
Purchasers need to ensure that the Contract of Sale clearly sets out who a termination notice under section 31 can be given, or the place where a notice can be left. 
Special Conditions to the standard form of Contract of Sale of Real Estate should be drafted to clarify the role of a real estate agent. 
Appeal 
The decision of Cameron J was appealed to the Court of Appeal. The decision of the Court of Appeal will be dealt with in a subsequent post. 
Legislative amendment
Sub-section 31(3) was replaced and section 31A was introduced into the Sale of Land Act, 1962, with retrospective effect, to clarify the position of service of a Notice of Cooling Off on a real estate agent. 
It is now clear that real estate agents are agents for the purpose of section 31 of the Sale of Land Act, 1962. 
WG Stark
Hayden Starke Chambers

Tuesday, 1 August 2017

Leo Cussen Property Law Conference 2017

This morning, I have the honour of chairing the Leo Cussen Property Law Conference 2017.  

It promises to be an interesting and useful day of Continuing Professional Development. 

For full details, see: https://store.leocussen.edu.au/products/property-law-conference-2017


WG Stark
Hayden Starke Chambers

Tuesday, 6 June 2017

New definition of PPS Lease under the PPSA is now law

Further to my post on 12 May 2017 (see: http://bit.ly/2qRldhJ), the new definition of 'PPS Lease' under the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (PPSA) came into effect on 20 May 2017.

As a result, section 13 of the PPSA now extends the minimum duration of PPS leases from more than one year, to more than two years. 


The Act also now makes it clear that leases of an indefinite term will not be deemed to be PPS leases unless and until they run for a period of more than two years. 

W G Stark 

Hayden Starke Chambers

Friday, 12 May 2017

When will the PPSA be amended to extend the minimum duration of PPS leases to 2 years?

According to the PPSR web site (see: https://www.ppsr.gov.au/blog-speeches/pps-leases-bill-passed-australian-parliament) yesterday the Personal Property Securities Amendment (PPS Leases) Bill 2017 (Cth) was passed by the Australian Parliament.

This Bill amends section 13 of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 to extend the minimum duration of PPS leases from more than one year, to more than two years. 

This Bill also amends the Act to provide that leases of an indefinite term will not be deemed to be PPS leases unless and until they run for a period of more than two years.

The second reading speech claims that the Bill will significantly reduce the regulatory impact which the Act is having on short term hire and rental businesses, the majority of which are small to medium enterprise. 

The hire and rental sector almost exclusively uses indefinite term leases which usually run for less than a week and rarely exceed a period of two years. 

Very few hire and rental industry related transactions would be caught by the amended provision due to the increased minimum duration. 

Section 13 of the Act as amended will continue to capture longer term high value hire and rental industry leases appropriately

In the next few days, it will go to the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia to receive Royal Assent.

The Bill will commence operation the day after it receives Royal Assent; this will be notified via further announcements on the PPSR website and PPS Register. 

WG Stark 
Hayden Starke Chambers